1 00:00:01,001 --> 00:00:02,302 3000. 2 00:00:03,537 --> 00:00:05,239 We're not getting any oxygen. 3 00:00:05,272 --> 00:00:07,708 We have the terrain alarm. 4 00:00:07,741 --> 00:00:09,443 We are in an emergency. 5 00:00:15,148 --> 00:00:17,017 This is a true story. 6 00:00:17,084 --> 00:00:18,685 The reconstructions are based 7 00:00:18,752 --> 00:00:20,621 on original cockpit voice recordings 8 00:00:20,687 --> 00:00:22,623 and eyewitness accounts. 9 00:00:24,124 --> 00:00:28,061 No family wants to lose... a loved one. 10 00:00:29,630 --> 00:00:30,864 A daughter, a son. 11 00:00:32,766 --> 00:00:36,003 None of us think it's going to happen to our family. 12 00:00:36,036 --> 00:00:39,206 We read about these horrible crashes, 13 00:00:39,273 --> 00:00:42,209 and we think, "Thank God." You know... 14 00:00:42,876 --> 00:00:45,245 Chances are it won't happen to us. 15 00:00:45,279 --> 00:00:47,047 The odds are in our favour. 16 00:00:56,089 --> 00:00:57,791 - You got it? - Yeah! 17 00:00:57,824 --> 00:01:01,228 - Well, what are you doing? - It just got worse, okay? 18 00:01:01,261 --> 00:01:04,665 In January 2000, an Air Alaska jet 19 00:01:04,731 --> 00:01:08,235 with 88 passengers and crew suffered a catastrophic failure 20 00:01:08,302 --> 00:01:10,037 that tore it from the sky. 21 00:01:10,070 --> 00:01:14,341 A shocking chain of negligence and error that led to disaster. 22 00:01:16,610 --> 00:01:19,179 When a whistleblower mechanic from the airline 23 00:01:19,213 --> 00:01:22,349 tried to sound the alarm about faulty maintenance procedures, 24 00:01:22,416 --> 00:01:24,551 he was suspended from his job. 25 00:01:26,987 --> 00:01:30,424 The investigation exposes deeply worrying shortcomings 26 00:01:30,457 --> 00:01:31,959 in maintenance and regulation 27 00:01:31,992 --> 00:01:34,361 that afflict the airline industry. 28 00:01:34,394 --> 00:01:36,830 It shows how a series of devastating errors 29 00:01:36,897 --> 00:01:39,399 combined to produce a tragic accident, 30 00:01:39,466 --> 00:01:41,668 one that could happen again... 31 00:01:45,239 --> 00:01:48,041 - We're stalled. - I can't release It! 32 00:02:19,039 --> 00:02:22,176 Puerto Vallarta is a popular holiday resort 33 00:02:22,209 --> 00:02:23,944 on the Mexican Pacific coast, 34 00:02:24,011 --> 00:02:25,913 one of several Mexican destinations 35 00:02:25,979 --> 00:02:28,015 served by Alaskan Airlines. 36 00:02:30,551 --> 00:02:33,820 Colleen Werley went there to celebrate a family birthday. 37 00:02:33,854 --> 00:02:36,557 The 34-year-old was a keen traveller 38 00:02:36,623 --> 00:02:39,927 who spoke Spanish well and had visited Mexico many times. 39 00:02:57,344 --> 00:02:59,413 Colleen and the other holiday-makers returning 40 00:02:59,479 --> 00:03:03,550 from Puerto Vallarta settle in for the 4-hour flight to San Francisco. 41 00:03:03,584 --> 00:03:06,153 In the warm afterglow of their holidays, 42 00:03:06,220 --> 00:03:08,255 they are looking to the future. 43 00:03:11,425 --> 00:03:13,560 Colleen and her fiancé Monty were planning 44 00:03:13,627 --> 00:03:15,729 to start a family later that year. 45 00:03:22,336 --> 00:03:25,539 The pilots on flight 261 are very experienced. 46 00:03:25,606 --> 00:03:28,876 Both Captain Ted Thompson, and First Officer Bill Tansky 47 00:03:28,942 --> 00:03:31,745 have thousands of hours flying MD-80s. 48 00:03:31,812 --> 00:03:33,747 They know the plane well. 49 00:03:37,384 --> 00:03:40,587 The MD-83 is one of a successful group of rear engine, 50 00:03:40,621 --> 00:03:42,055 low-wing planes. 51 00:03:42,122 --> 00:03:44,324 Originally launched in 1980, 52 00:03:44,391 --> 00:03:47,127 over 1 100 were delivered worldwide. 53 00:03:49,830 --> 00:03:52,065 - Flaps. - Check. Confirmed. 54 00:03:52,099 --> 00:03:54,101 - Spoilers. - Check. Armed. 55 00:03:54,134 --> 00:03:56,803 But on the 31st of January 2000, 56 00:03:56,870 --> 00:03:59,039 as they prepared Flight 261, 57 00:03:59,106 --> 00:04:01,441 Thompson and Tansky had no idea 58 00:04:01,508 --> 00:04:05,179 that deep in the plane's tail lay a critical weakness. 59 00:04:22,296 --> 00:04:24,364 Colleen Werley and her fiancé Monty 60 00:04:24,431 --> 00:04:26,834 were planning their forthcoming wedding. 61 00:04:28,402 --> 00:04:30,871 They had announced their engagement at Christmas time. 62 00:04:30,938 --> 00:04:35,108 So it was a time for everybody to sort of congratulate them 63 00:04:35,175 --> 00:04:39,279 so we decided we'd have a party for the family. 64 00:04:41,548 --> 00:04:45,018 Abby Miller Bush had visited Mexico with her husband Ryan 65 00:04:45,085 --> 00:04:48,355 and their friends to celebrate her new job at Microsoft. 66 00:04:48,388 --> 00:04:50,324 It's hard to describe... 67 00:04:53,260 --> 00:04:55,495 ...how joyful a girl she was. 68 00:04:55,529 --> 00:05:01,235 She was well known for that care that she had in her. 69 00:05:01,268 --> 00:05:04,905 A trait that you can't put a value on. 70 00:05:07,608 --> 00:05:10,277 Dean and I had been there a lot together 71 00:05:10,310 --> 00:05:12,646 and it was the first time that he went without me. 72 00:05:12,679 --> 00:05:15,082 Dean taught me how to play. 73 00:05:15,115 --> 00:05:18,519 He was always up. He told jokes a lot. 74 00:05:18,552 --> 00:05:21,088 People described him kind of as a puppy dog. 75 00:05:24,091 --> 00:05:26,627 Alaska Airlines was a successful carrier 76 00:05:26,693 --> 00:05:29,096 with routes up and down the west coast of America 77 00:05:29,162 --> 00:05:30,531 and into Mexico. 78 00:05:33,233 --> 00:05:37,104 Flight 261 left Puerto Vallarta as a routine flight 79 00:05:37,171 --> 00:05:39,139 with no hint of the danger to come. 80 00:05:42,409 --> 00:05:45,245 The devastating failure that would bring catastrophe 81 00:05:45,312 --> 00:05:48,248 to Flight 261 did not come out of the blue. 82 00:05:51,251 --> 00:05:54,121 In fact, it was the culmination of a chain of mistakes 83 00:05:54,188 --> 00:05:55,689 that began years earlier. 84 00:05:56,823 --> 00:05:59,860 Maintenance procedures at the company had come under scrutiny 85 00:05:59,927 --> 00:06:02,095 two years earlier when a whistleblower 86 00:06:02,162 --> 00:06:06,133 set off an investigation by the Federal Aviation Administration. 87 00:06:07,835 --> 00:06:10,604 But the day Flight 261 left Puerta Vallarta, 88 00:06:10,671 --> 00:06:12,840 the investigation was still underway, 89 00:06:12,906 --> 00:06:15,843 and the whistleblower suspended from his work. 90 00:06:18,378 --> 00:06:20,781 Shortly after takeoff, Captain Thompson 91 00:06:20,848 --> 00:06:24,518 and First Officer Tansky get the first sign of trouble. 92 00:06:24,551 --> 00:06:28,055 The horizontal stabiliser on the tail plane won't move. 93 00:06:28,088 --> 00:06:32,025 The pilots carry out a standard checklist to try and free it. 94 00:06:35,362 --> 00:06:37,164 Stabiliser trim switch. 95 00:06:37,197 --> 00:06:38,599 Normal. 96 00:06:38,632 --> 00:06:41,735 Circuit breakers, reset if tripped. 97 00:06:41,768 --> 00:06:44,204 D-9, D-10, D-11 okay. 98 00:06:44,238 --> 00:06:47,674 The stabiliser on the MD-83 is the 40-foot wide 99 00:06:47,741 --> 00:06:49,943 horizontal surface of the front of the tail. 100 00:06:49,977 --> 00:06:52,012 It's like another wing. 101 00:06:52,045 --> 00:06:54,281 Together with the elevators at the rear of the tail, 102 00:06:54,348 --> 00:06:56,817 the stabiliser is used to adjust the angle 103 00:06:56,884 --> 00:06:58,418 of the plane in flight. 104 00:07:02,356 --> 00:07:04,157 The stabiliser was jammed. 105 00:07:04,191 --> 00:07:06,593 Thompson and Tansky assumed there was a fault 106 00:07:06,627 --> 00:07:08,862 in the electric motors that move it up and down. 107 00:07:08,896 --> 00:07:11,331 They believed they could fix the problem. 108 00:07:11,365 --> 00:07:14,268 They had no idea they were in great danger. 109 00:07:15,202 --> 00:07:19,473 What they dealt with was something that really snuck up on them. 110 00:07:19,506 --> 00:07:22,643 It was not supposed to be a big deal. 111 00:07:22,676 --> 00:07:24,411 If it had been, they would've turned around 112 00:07:24,478 --> 00:07:27,181 and gone back in to the Mexican airfield they came out of. 113 00:07:27,214 --> 00:07:30,117 But they were led down this road 114 00:07:30,184 --> 00:07:33,687 of accepting this problem as a small problem, 115 00:07:33,754 --> 00:07:36,890 so it's perfectly alright to troubleshoot it. 116 00:07:38,025 --> 00:07:40,761 The pilots repeatedly try the two switches 117 00:07:40,827 --> 00:07:42,462 that operate the stabiliser: 118 00:07:42,496 --> 00:07:45,599 The primary motor activated by the switch on the control stick 119 00:07:45,666 --> 00:07:47,301 known as the pickle switch 120 00:07:47,367 --> 00:07:50,604 and the sliding suitcase handles on the central console. 121 00:07:50,637 --> 00:07:52,439 Either system operative? 122 00:07:55,542 --> 00:07:58,045 - No. - Both systems inoperative. 123 00:07:58,078 --> 00:08:00,514 Consider stab jam, do not use autopilot. 124 00:08:00,581 --> 00:08:01,615 Check. 125 00:08:02,850 --> 00:08:04,384 The jam stabiliser 126 00:08:04,451 --> 00:08:06,787 is pushing the aircraft down towards the ground. 127 00:08:06,820 --> 00:08:10,924 At 28 500 feet, the pilots switch off the autopilot 128 00:08:10,991 --> 00:08:12,993 and fly the plane manually. 129 00:08:13,026 --> 00:08:15,762 They have to pull back hard on the control column 130 00:08:15,829 --> 00:08:17,598 to lift the nose of the plane up. 131 00:08:17,631 --> 00:08:20,133 This requires considerable effort. 132 00:08:20,167 --> 00:08:22,703 The plane climbs for the next seven minutes 133 00:08:22,769 --> 00:08:25,939 to its cruising altitude of 32 000 feet. 134 00:08:25,973 --> 00:08:28,942 As they fly up the coast, the pilots contact 135 00:08:29,009 --> 00:08:31,879 Alaska maintenance department for assistance. 136 00:08:31,912 --> 00:08:33,981 Maintenance, we need to know if any fault 137 00:08:34,047 --> 00:08:36,283 like this got reported recently for this aircraft. 138 00:08:36,316 --> 00:08:38,018 And whether there are any switches 139 00:08:38,085 --> 00:08:39,653 that we might not be aware of 140 00:08:39,720 --> 00:08:41,455 that could get those motors turning again. 141 00:08:41,488 --> 00:08:43,690 Roger 261. I... 142 00:08:43,724 --> 00:08:45,759 have verified no history on your aircraft 143 00:08:45,826 --> 00:08:47,227 from the past thirty days. 144 00:08:47,261 --> 00:08:49,897 Yeah, we didn't see anything in the logbook. 145 00:08:49,930 --> 00:08:52,165 Why don't you move your seat forward 146 00:08:52,232 --> 00:08:54,067 and I'll check this pedestal back there. 147 00:08:55,202 --> 00:08:56,770 Beyond that, I don't think there's anything 148 00:08:56,803 --> 00:08:58,238 we haven't checked. 149 00:08:58,272 --> 00:09:02,409 I use the example... the average layman, I think, can understand. 150 00:09:02,442 --> 00:09:05,879 If you try to start your car 151 00:09:05,946 --> 00:09:09,816 and it doesn't crank, you try jiggling the key 152 00:09:09,883 --> 00:09:12,119 in the socket and then try it again. 153 00:09:12,152 --> 00:09:15,856 And I think the crew, was probably understandably, 154 00:09:15,923 --> 00:09:17,624 going through a lot of these. 155 00:09:17,658 --> 00:09:19,059 "Well, maybe it'll work now, 156 00:09:19,126 --> 00:09:21,328 or let's try this, let's try that." 157 00:09:22,496 --> 00:09:25,132 The pilots want to divert to Los Angeles, 158 00:09:25,199 --> 00:09:27,234 but Alaska Airline's dispatch, 159 00:09:27,301 --> 00:09:29,670 co-ordinating the movements of the company's planes, 160 00:09:29,736 --> 00:09:32,539 is worried this will upset the busy schedule. 161 00:09:32,573 --> 00:09:35,809 261, dispatch. Uh, if you want to land at LA, 162 00:09:35,876 --> 00:09:38,445 of course, for safety reasons, we will do that. 163 00:09:38,478 --> 00:09:40,247 I'll tell you though, if we land in LA, 164 00:09:40,314 --> 00:09:43,183 we'll be looking at probably an hour, 165 00:09:43,250 --> 00:09:46,019 an hour and a half. We got a major flow problem going right now. 166 00:09:46,053 --> 00:09:49,790 Well, boy, you really put me in a spot up here. 167 00:09:50,757 --> 00:09:53,627 I don't want to hear that the flow is the reason you're calling 168 00:09:53,660 --> 00:09:56,530 because I'm concerned about overflying suitable airports. 169 00:09:56,563 --> 00:09:58,832 Well, we wanna do what's safe, 170 00:09:58,899 --> 00:10:00,234 so if that's what you feel is safe, 171 00:10:00,300 --> 00:10:02,469 just wanna make sure you have all the info. 172 00:10:03,537 --> 00:10:04,805 We might ask if they have 173 00:10:04,872 --> 00:10:06,173 a ground school instructor available, 174 00:10:06,240 --> 00:10:08,809 we could discuss it with him. And a simulator instructor. 175 00:10:09,776 --> 00:10:11,144 Dispatch 261. 176 00:10:11,178 --> 00:10:13,113 We're wondering if we can get some support 177 00:10:13,180 --> 00:10:14,948 out of the instructors up there. 178 00:10:14,982 --> 00:10:17,985 Thompson and Tansky now ask for a pilot instructor 179 00:10:18,051 --> 00:10:20,721 who might know the solution to their unusual problem. 180 00:10:20,754 --> 00:10:21,722 Stand by. 181 00:10:21,755 --> 00:10:23,790 As they wait for a reply, 182 00:10:23,857 --> 00:10:25,959 their frustration begins to show. 183 00:10:33,901 --> 00:10:35,903 Just... drives me nuts, you know? 184 00:10:35,936 --> 00:10:38,005 Not that I want to go on about it. But... 185 00:10:38,038 --> 00:10:40,541 It just blows me away. They think we're gonna land, 186 00:10:40,607 --> 00:10:43,610 they're gonna fix it, now they're worried about the flow. 187 00:10:43,644 --> 00:10:46,313 Well, I'm sorry... 188 00:10:46,346 --> 00:10:48,749 They're putting pressure on you. 189 00:10:48,782 --> 00:10:51,385 Well, no... Yeah. 190 00:10:53,954 --> 00:10:55,956 The pilots need to think about what will happen 191 00:10:56,023 --> 00:10:57,791 when they descend for landing. 192 00:10:57,824 --> 00:10:59,493 How will the plane behave? 193 00:10:59,526 --> 00:11:01,595 Will they be able to control it? 194 00:11:01,628 --> 00:11:04,464 But several minutes after requesting help from the ground, 195 00:11:04,531 --> 00:11:06,700 they are getting no advice. 196 00:11:09,636 --> 00:11:12,873 As Flight 261 approached Los Angeles off the coast, 197 00:11:12,940 --> 00:11:15,642 the problems on board were about to get far worse. 198 00:11:31,592 --> 00:11:34,928 The pilots on the crippled Air Alaska Flight 261 199 00:11:34,995 --> 00:11:37,831 are flying manually at 32 000 feet 200 00:11:37,898 --> 00:11:40,033 in a plane that has a jammed stabiliser 201 00:11:40,100 --> 00:11:42,669 that is forcing the plane's nose down. 202 00:11:45,439 --> 00:11:47,107 The pilots have another go 203 00:11:47,174 --> 00:11:49,142 at freeing up the jammed stabiliser. 204 00:11:49,176 --> 00:11:52,145 They switch on both the electric motors that control it. 205 00:11:52,179 --> 00:11:53,547 This'll click it off. 206 00:11:54,715 --> 00:11:56,717 Holy... 207 00:12:06,026 --> 00:12:09,096 You got it? - Yeah! What are you doing? 208 00:12:09,129 --> 00:12:10,764 It clicked off! 209 00:12:13,267 --> 00:12:17,204 From 31 000 feet, Flight 261 plunges down 210 00:12:17,237 --> 00:12:20,574 for over a minute, the crew battle for control. 211 00:12:21,508 --> 00:12:23,010 It just got worse, okay. 212 00:12:27,514 --> 00:12:29,650 We're stalled. 213 00:12:33,921 --> 00:12:36,323 At first, they pull back on the control columns 214 00:12:36,356 --> 00:12:37,724 to fight the dive. 215 00:12:37,758 --> 00:12:40,494 But then, the pilots push the aircraft's nose down 216 00:12:40,561 --> 00:12:42,496 into the dive to regain control. 217 00:12:42,529 --> 00:12:45,332 It's a risky manoeuvre, pushing the plane's speed 218 00:12:45,365 --> 00:12:47,601 to 350 miles an hour. 219 00:12:48,535 --> 00:12:50,070 You gotta release it, ya gotta release it. 220 00:12:50,737 --> 00:12:53,240 The pilots slowly bring the plane out of its dive 221 00:12:53,273 --> 00:12:55,209 and back under control. 222 00:13:05,686 --> 00:13:06,987 Let's get speedbrakes. 223 00:13:09,356 --> 00:13:11,358 Give me high pressure pumps. - Okay. 224 00:13:13,527 --> 00:13:15,362 Help me back, help me back. 225 00:13:15,395 --> 00:13:16,430 Okay. 226 00:13:28,408 --> 00:13:30,777 Centre Alaska, 261, 227 00:13:30,844 --> 00:13:32,913 we are in a dive here. 228 00:13:32,946 --> 00:13:35,616 I've lost control, vertical pitch. 229 00:13:36,750 --> 00:13:38,852 Alaska 261, say again, sir. 230 00:13:38,886 --> 00:13:41,655 Yeah, we're out of 26 000 feet. 231 00:13:41,688 --> 00:13:45,526 We are in a vertical dive, not a dive yet, 232 00:13:45,592 --> 00:13:48,762 but we've lost vertical control of our airplane. 233 00:13:50,697 --> 00:13:52,666 Just help me. 234 00:13:52,699 --> 00:13:57,404 Once we get the speed slowed, maybe... we'll be okay. 235 00:13:57,437 --> 00:13:59,773 Maintaining level flight is difficult. 236 00:13:59,806 --> 00:14:04,144 The jammed stabiliser keeps pushing the nose of the plane down. 237 00:14:06,680 --> 00:14:09,183 We're at 23-7. Request... 238 00:14:10,517 --> 00:14:12,352 Yeah, we got it under control here. 239 00:14:12,386 --> 00:14:13,720 No, we don't. 240 00:14:17,591 --> 00:14:18,825 - Okay. - Okay. 241 00:14:21,461 --> 00:14:24,198 To counteract the downward force of the stabiliser, 242 00:14:24,264 --> 00:14:26,200 the pilots use the elevators, 243 00:14:26,266 --> 00:14:28,702 movable panels at the back of the tail 244 00:14:28,769 --> 00:14:30,871 linked by cables to the control column. 245 00:14:30,904 --> 00:14:33,574 The pilots pull with all their might. 246 00:14:33,607 --> 00:14:37,110 The fate of the plane hangs on the strength of their arms. 247 00:14:38,612 --> 00:14:41,315 In the cabin, frightened passengers try to recover 248 00:14:41,381 --> 00:14:43,083 from the terrifying plunge. 249 00:14:43,116 --> 00:14:45,953 They have no idea what might happen next. 250 00:14:46,954 --> 00:14:50,123 Holiday memories are replaced by the fear of dying. 251 00:14:53,961 --> 00:14:55,529 Dean was one of those people 252 00:14:55,596 --> 00:14:58,999 who would talk to whoever was around him. 253 00:14:59,032 --> 00:15:01,468 I am absolutely certain that he was talking 254 00:15:01,535 --> 00:15:04,338 to the person that was sitting next to him on the plane. 255 00:15:04,371 --> 00:15:06,473 I am sure that they had a connection. 256 00:15:09,076 --> 00:15:12,279 Colleen was... very unique 257 00:15:12,346 --> 00:15:16,750 from my other kids and she loved to travel. 258 00:15:16,783 --> 00:15:19,419 She was a beautiful girl. 259 00:15:23,357 --> 00:15:26,360 Here was a 25-year-old who... 260 00:15:26,393 --> 00:15:29,630 It was like she had her own private rocketship. 261 00:15:30,464 --> 00:15:32,432 She was really going places. 262 00:15:37,337 --> 00:15:40,107 In the cockpit, the pilots struggle to control 263 00:15:40,174 --> 00:15:42,743 the plane's speed so they can land. 264 00:15:42,776 --> 00:15:44,811 They've got a handful of airplane, 265 00:15:44,845 --> 00:15:48,182 they get her stabilised and they're now in a situation 266 00:15:48,248 --> 00:15:50,584 where they make the decision properly 267 00:15:50,651 --> 00:15:53,520 to go in on an emergency landing to Los Angeles International. 268 00:15:53,554 --> 00:15:56,690 And they have to be able to slow the airplane up, 269 00:15:56,723 --> 00:15:58,625 so you gotta experiment a little bit. 270 00:15:58,659 --> 00:16:00,694 Let's take the speed brakes off. 271 00:16:00,727 --> 00:16:02,896 No, leave them there. It seems to be helping. 272 00:16:05,532 --> 00:16:07,835 Damn, okay, it really wants to pitch down. 273 00:16:07,868 --> 00:16:09,036 Okay. 274 00:16:09,770 --> 00:16:11,371 - Don't mess with that. - I agree with you. 275 00:16:13,507 --> 00:16:16,176 With the plane under temporary control, 276 00:16:16,243 --> 00:16:17,778 the crew make the fateful decision 277 00:16:17,845 --> 00:16:19,446 to do more troubleshooting. 278 00:16:19,479 --> 00:16:22,115 They need a block of clear space around the aircraft 279 00:16:22,182 --> 00:16:24,484 in case they lose control again. 280 00:16:24,518 --> 00:16:26,854 They contact air traffic control. 281 00:16:27,654 --> 00:16:30,357 Alaska 261. Say your conditions. 282 00:16:30,390 --> 00:16:34,094 261, we are at 24 000 feet, 283 00:16:34,161 --> 00:16:35,562 kind of stabilised. 284 00:16:36,597 --> 00:16:39,199 We're slowing down here 285 00:16:39,233 --> 00:16:41,134 and we're gonna do a little troubleshooting. 286 00:16:41,168 --> 00:16:42,936 Can you give me a blocked altitude 287 00:16:43,003 --> 00:16:45,005 between 20 and 25? 288 00:16:45,038 --> 00:16:47,741 Alaska 2-6-1, maintain block altitude, 289 00:16:47,808 --> 00:16:50,978 flight level 2-0-0 through flight level 2-5-0. 290 00:16:52,079 --> 00:16:54,681 The pilots know they now have clear air space 291 00:16:54,748 --> 00:16:56,483 above and below the plane. 292 00:16:56,550 --> 00:16:58,585 They try to figure out their next move. 293 00:16:58,619 --> 00:17:00,787 You got the airplane. Let me just try it. 294 00:17:00,821 --> 00:17:01,955 Okay. 295 00:17:03,390 --> 00:17:04,625 How hard is it? 296 00:17:04,658 --> 00:17:06,793 I don't know, my adrenaline's going. 297 00:17:06,860 --> 00:17:08,829 It was really rough back there for a while. 298 00:17:08,862 --> 00:17:10,764 Yeah, it is. 299 00:17:10,797 --> 00:17:13,066 Whatever we did is no good, let's not do that again. 300 00:17:13,100 --> 00:17:15,269 Yeah, it went to down, to full-nose down. 301 00:17:16,770 --> 00:17:18,405 It's worse than it was before? 302 00:17:18,438 --> 00:17:20,240 Yeah, we're in much worse shape now. 303 00:17:20,274 --> 00:17:23,544 The crew know this is no mere electrical problem. 304 00:17:23,577 --> 00:17:25,345 From what they've experienced, 305 00:17:25,412 --> 00:17:27,614 they assume the stabiliser is now jammed. 306 00:17:29,550 --> 00:17:33,086 I think it's at the stop, full stop and I'm thinking... 307 00:17:33,153 --> 00:17:34,388 can it get any worse? 308 00:17:34,421 --> 00:17:35,756 But it probably can. 309 00:17:36,823 --> 00:17:39,259 But let's slow it, let's get down 310 00:17:39,293 --> 00:17:42,729 to 200 knots and see what happens. 311 00:17:44,531 --> 00:17:46,633 The crisis is getting worse. 312 00:17:46,667 --> 00:17:48,836 Uncertain how the plane will react 313 00:17:48,869 --> 00:17:51,705 if they try to slow it down, the pilots must still pull 314 00:17:51,772 --> 00:17:54,274 on the elevators to maintain level flight. 315 00:17:54,308 --> 00:17:55,843 Captain Thompson once again 316 00:17:55,909 --> 00:17:57,678 tries to get help from maintenance. 317 00:17:57,711 --> 00:17:59,813 Maintenance, 2-6-1, are you on? 318 00:18:01,982 --> 00:18:04,151 Yeah, 2-6-1, this is maintenance. 319 00:18:05,752 --> 00:18:08,255 Okay, we did both the pickle switch 320 00:18:08,322 --> 00:18:10,991 and the suitcase handles and it ran away... 321 00:18:11,058 --> 00:18:13,460 it ran away full-nose trim down. 322 00:18:13,493 --> 00:18:15,429 Oh, it ran away trim down? 323 00:18:17,464 --> 00:18:19,533 And now, we're in a damn pinch, 324 00:18:19,600 --> 00:18:22,703 and we're holding. We're worse than we were before. 325 00:18:32,479 --> 00:18:34,214 You're getting full-nose trim down, 326 00:18:34,281 --> 00:18:36,450 but you don't get no-nose trim up, is that correct? 327 00:18:36,483 --> 00:18:38,185 That's affirm. 328 00:18:38,252 --> 00:18:41,555 We went to full-nose down and I'm afraid to try it again 329 00:18:41,622 --> 00:18:43,790 to see if it would go in the other direction. 330 00:18:43,824 --> 00:18:45,859 Okay, well, your discretion. 331 00:18:45,926 --> 00:18:47,794 If you want to try it, that's okay with me. 332 00:18:47,828 --> 00:18:50,697 If not, that's fine. See you at the gate. 333 00:18:54,334 --> 00:18:57,571 As important as it is to have that ground contact 334 00:18:57,638 --> 00:18:59,940 with people, with maintenance manuals, 335 00:19:00,007 --> 00:19:01,975 and experience on the ground and the ability to call up 336 00:19:02,042 --> 00:19:05,746 the manufacturer, it's not always going to give you a magic answer. 337 00:19:05,779 --> 00:19:07,981 The crew had already gone through every logic tree 338 00:19:08,048 --> 00:19:09,449 they possibly could think of. 339 00:19:10,517 --> 00:19:12,786 Maintenance clearly do not appreciate 340 00:19:12,853 --> 00:19:14,588 the gravity of the situation. 341 00:19:14,621 --> 00:19:17,391 This is the last the crew will hear from them. 342 00:19:17,424 --> 00:19:19,660 No one can help the pilots now, 343 00:19:19,726 --> 00:19:22,596 as they struggle with the plane's faulty stabiliser. 344 00:19:22,629 --> 00:19:24,464 Ever professional, however, 345 00:19:24,531 --> 00:19:27,234 they try to put the passengers at ease. 346 00:19:34,474 --> 00:19:37,477 Folks, we have had a flight control problem up front here. 347 00:19:37,511 --> 00:19:39,146 We're working it uh... 348 00:19:39,179 --> 00:19:41,949 That's Los Angeles off to the right, there, 349 00:19:41,982 --> 00:19:43,717 that's where we're intending to go. 350 00:19:43,750 --> 00:19:46,720 We're pretty busy up here working this situation. 351 00:19:46,753 --> 00:19:48,555 I don't anticipate any big problems 352 00:19:48,622 --> 00:19:51,491 once we get a couple of sub-systems on the line. 353 00:19:51,525 --> 00:19:53,894 But we will be going into LAX 354 00:19:53,961 --> 00:19:55,662 and I anticipate us parking there 355 00:19:55,696 --> 00:19:58,098 in about 20 to 30 minutes. 356 00:19:58,131 --> 00:20:01,435 In fact, they will never make it to Los Angeles. 357 00:20:01,468 --> 00:20:04,037 A full-blown disaster is about to unfold. 358 00:20:17,518 --> 00:20:20,787 After the terrifying 8000-feet plunge downwards, 359 00:20:20,854 --> 00:20:23,790 Alaska 261 has now levelled out. 360 00:20:23,824 --> 00:20:25,926 LA? Alaska 261, we're with you. 361 00:20:26,760 --> 00:20:30,330 We're at 22-5, we have a jammed stabiliser 362 00:20:30,397 --> 00:20:33,133 and we're maintaining altitude with difficulty. 363 00:20:33,200 --> 00:20:36,603 But we can maintain altitude, we think, 364 00:20:36,670 --> 00:20:40,374 and our intention is to land in Los Angeles. 365 00:20:42,342 --> 00:20:44,745 The pilots request to be routed out 366 00:20:44,811 --> 00:20:46,413 over the Pacific Ocean. 367 00:20:48,715 --> 00:20:50,784 Centre Alaska 261. 368 00:20:50,817 --> 00:20:54,888 I need to get down about 10, change my configurations, 369 00:20:54,922 --> 00:20:57,257 to make sure I can control the jet 370 00:20:57,324 --> 00:21:00,594 and I'd like to do that over the bay, here, if I may. 371 00:21:01,595 --> 00:21:04,164 If the worst happens, they don't want to kill people 372 00:21:04,198 --> 00:21:06,033 on the ground as well as in the plane. 373 00:21:06,066 --> 00:21:07,835 There are a lot of lives saved 374 00:21:07,901 --> 00:21:09,803 that people maybe don't realise 375 00:21:09,870 --> 00:21:11,572 by the fact that this air crew said, 376 00:21:11,638 --> 00:21:13,173 "Let's stay out over the water 377 00:21:13,240 --> 00:21:15,375 until we've got this thing completely under control." 378 00:21:16,343 --> 00:21:18,512 As they manoeuvre over the ocean, 379 00:21:18,579 --> 00:21:20,614 the crew again ask air traffic control 380 00:21:20,681 --> 00:21:23,150 for clear space around the plane. 381 00:21:23,183 --> 00:21:25,586 Alaska 2-61, fly a heading of 2-8-0 382 00:21:25,619 --> 00:21:28,288 and descend and maintain 1-7 thousand. 383 00:21:28,322 --> 00:21:31,124 2-8-0 and 1-7, 17 000, 384 00:21:31,158 --> 00:21:32,726 Alaska 261. 385 00:21:32,793 --> 00:21:35,662 And we're generally needing a block altitude. 386 00:21:35,729 --> 00:21:37,164 Alaska 2-61, roger. 387 00:21:43,837 --> 00:21:45,606 I need everything picked up 388 00:21:45,672 --> 00:21:47,241 and everybody strapped down 389 00:21:47,274 --> 00:21:51,345 because I'm going to unload the aircraft 390 00:21:51,411 --> 00:21:54,515 and see if we can regain control that way. 391 00:21:58,952 --> 00:22:02,155 The pilots concentrate on trying to fix the plane. 392 00:22:02,189 --> 00:22:04,558 - I'm test-flying now. - How does it feel? 393 00:22:04,591 --> 00:22:05,993 It's wanting to pitch over more. 394 00:22:06,026 --> 00:22:07,661 - Really? - Yeah. 395 00:22:07,728 --> 00:22:09,563 Try flaps? 15-11. 396 00:22:09,630 --> 00:22:10,964 Let's go to 11. 397 00:22:15,302 --> 00:22:16,470 Okay. Get some power on. 398 00:22:16,503 --> 00:22:18,872 - I'm at 250 knots. - Real hard? 399 00:22:18,906 --> 00:22:21,208 No, actually, it's pretty stable right here. 400 00:22:21,241 --> 00:22:23,810 But we got to get it down to 180. 401 00:22:24,878 --> 00:22:27,314 The crew try to slow the aircraft down 402 00:22:27,381 --> 00:22:29,449 to landing speed without losing control. 403 00:22:29,483 --> 00:22:33,253 But every move they make could have fatal consequences. 404 00:22:35,789 --> 00:22:39,526 Okay, bring the flaps and the slats back up for me. 405 00:22:39,560 --> 00:22:41,428 - Slats too? - Yeah. 406 00:22:41,461 --> 00:22:43,730 Treading a knife edge of control, 407 00:22:43,797 --> 00:22:46,533 the pilots are still trying to free up the stabiliser. 408 00:22:46,567 --> 00:22:48,869 What I wanna do is get the nose up... 409 00:22:48,936 --> 00:22:51,672 And then, let the nose fall through and 410 00:22:51,738 --> 00:22:54,775 see if we can stab it when it's unloaded. 411 00:22:57,244 --> 00:22:59,613 The only hope for the passengers is that 412 00:22:59,646 --> 00:23:01,381 the pilots' skill and experience 413 00:23:01,448 --> 00:23:03,517 can get the plane to Los Angeles airport. 414 00:23:04,151 --> 00:23:06,019 It's on the stop now, it's on the stop. 415 00:23:06,053 --> 00:23:07,554 Not according to this, it's not. 416 00:23:09,022 --> 00:23:11,558 As one effort after another fails, 417 00:23:11,592 --> 00:23:14,361 the crew wonder if the stabiliser is damaged. 418 00:23:15,863 --> 00:23:17,564 The trim might be... 419 00:23:17,631 --> 00:23:19,399 And then it might be, uh... 420 00:23:19,466 --> 00:23:20,868 If something's popped back there. 421 00:23:20,901 --> 00:23:22,002 Yeah. 422 00:23:22,035 --> 00:23:23,704 It might be mechanical damage too. 423 00:23:27,374 --> 00:23:30,844 I think if it's controllable, we ought to just try to land it. 424 00:23:30,878 --> 00:23:34,081 You think so? Okay. Let's head for LA. 425 00:23:35,215 --> 00:23:38,252 But just as they prepare to land in Los Angeles, 426 00:23:38,318 --> 00:23:40,888 something in the tail suddenly breaks. 427 00:23:41,755 --> 00:23:42,890 - Do you feel that? - Yeah. 428 00:23:42,923 --> 00:23:45,626 Okay, gimme slats. This is a bitch. 429 00:23:45,659 --> 00:23:47,160 - Is it? - Yeah. 430 00:23:54,234 --> 00:23:57,971 The plane dives straight down from 18 000 feet. 431 00:24:02,442 --> 00:24:05,679 To avoid collisions, Los Angeles control has warned 432 00:24:05,746 --> 00:24:09,883 the pilots of nearby planes that Alaska Flight 261 is in difficulty. 433 00:24:09,950 --> 00:24:13,120 These pilots now report back to the tower. 434 00:24:13,887 --> 00:24:16,123 That plane has just started to do a big huge plunge. 435 00:24:19,693 --> 00:24:20,627 Yeah! 436 00:24:21,195 --> 00:24:23,363 Yes, sir, he is definitely 437 00:24:23,430 --> 00:24:25,966 in a nose-down position, descending quite rapidly. 438 00:24:25,999 --> 00:24:27,668 Definitely out of control. 439 00:24:35,242 --> 00:24:36,777 The plane is inverted, sir. 440 00:24:36,810 --> 00:24:39,179 Okay. Yeah, he's inverted. 441 00:24:42,516 --> 00:24:44,718 The pilots can barely reach the controls. 442 00:24:47,387 --> 00:24:49,389 The plane is now upside down, 443 00:24:49,456 --> 00:24:51,091 but they believe they might be able 444 00:24:51,124 --> 00:24:53,026 to roll it out of the dive. 445 00:24:53,927 --> 00:24:55,429 Mayday. 446 00:24:55,462 --> 00:24:57,764 Push and roll. Push and roll. 447 00:24:58,498 --> 00:25:01,702 Push, dammit. Push, push, push. 448 00:25:01,735 --> 00:25:04,104 Push the blue side up! 449 00:25:04,137 --> 00:25:06,640 They tried to fly the airplane, even upside down. 450 00:25:06,673 --> 00:25:09,376 They never for a moment believed 451 00:25:09,443 --> 00:25:12,679 that they could not find a way to control this airplane. 452 00:25:12,713 --> 00:25:14,648 - Push! - I'm pushing! 453 00:25:14,681 --> 00:25:16,049 Okay. Let's get rudder. 454 00:25:16,116 --> 00:25:17,818 Left rudder! Left rudder! 455 00:25:17,851 --> 00:25:19,253 Can't reach it! 456 00:25:19,319 --> 00:25:21,522 Okay. Right rudder, right rudder! 457 00:25:23,090 --> 00:25:25,192 The plane was being knocked from side to side. 458 00:25:25,225 --> 00:25:27,694 It turned upside down. It was spinning. 459 00:25:27,728 --> 00:25:30,163 Persons were being thrown against the walls of the plane, 460 00:25:30,230 --> 00:25:31,832 falling out of their seats 461 00:25:31,899 --> 00:25:34,201 and the cockpit voice recorder screaming. 462 00:25:34,234 --> 00:25:35,903 Um... 463 00:25:35,969 --> 00:25:38,705 Unbelievable... 464 00:25:38,739 --> 00:25:42,009 horrible last few minutes of their lives. 465 00:25:42,042 --> 00:25:45,612 - Are we flying? - We're flying. We're flying. 466 00:25:45,646 --> 00:25:47,447 Tell them what we're doing. 467 00:25:47,481 --> 00:25:49,650 - Let me just... - God damn! 468 00:25:50,617 --> 00:25:52,219 We're upside down and we're flying. 469 00:25:53,253 --> 00:25:55,622 And it was so violently upside down 470 00:25:55,689 --> 00:25:58,058 that the pilots were hanging from their shoulder straps. 471 00:25:58,091 --> 00:26:00,627 Passengers don't have shoulder straps. 472 00:26:13,774 --> 00:26:14,908 Here we go. 473 00:26:26,520 --> 00:26:28,689 Yeah, he just hit the water. 474 00:26:29,556 --> 00:26:34,061 Yes, sir. He... He hit the water. He's down. 475 00:26:42,369 --> 00:26:45,372 After a terrifying 60-second dive, 476 00:26:45,439 --> 00:26:50,777 Flight 261 hit the Pacific Ocean at over 250 miles an hour. 477 00:26:56,450 --> 00:26:59,586 Rescue helicopters were soon at the crash site, 478 00:26:59,653 --> 00:27:01,588 but there were no survivors. 479 00:27:01,622 --> 00:27:04,157 The plane had broken up on impact. 480 00:27:04,191 --> 00:27:06,393 88 passengers and crew 481 00:27:06,460 --> 00:27:09,530 including three young children died instantly. 482 00:27:17,371 --> 00:27:21,408 Fred Miller lost his daughter Abbey and her husband Ryan. 483 00:27:21,441 --> 00:27:23,410 These people suffered on the way down. 484 00:27:23,443 --> 00:27:25,445 This was not a pretty way to die. 485 00:27:27,814 --> 00:27:30,951 One witness who I met, 486 00:27:31,018 --> 00:27:33,687 a jogger on the beach down at Port Wynamie, 487 00:27:33,754 --> 00:27:36,023 he said, "You look like you lost somebody." 488 00:27:36,056 --> 00:27:37,791 I said, "I did, my daughter." 489 00:27:39,293 --> 00:27:41,195 He said, "You know, I saw the plane go down." 490 00:27:42,663 --> 00:27:47,234 He said the plane was inverted and twisting and flipping 491 00:27:47,301 --> 00:27:51,305 and then, he said it spun at times, almost like a top. 492 00:27:52,339 --> 00:27:54,208 He said, "To think people... 493 00:27:55,309 --> 00:27:59,780 Somebody who has a life to live 494 00:27:59,847 --> 00:28:02,082 is in there dying..." 495 00:28:02,149 --> 00:28:06,153 He said, "It's one of the most horrifying memories 496 00:28:06,220 --> 00:28:07,754 I'll ever have." 497 00:28:15,295 --> 00:28:18,732 Susan Da Silva lost her husband Dean. 498 00:28:18,765 --> 00:28:23,036 I know that they went through a horrible horrible experience. 499 00:28:23,070 --> 00:28:27,741 This was a violent end these people suffered. 500 00:28:27,774 --> 00:28:31,512 There were no bodies that were intact or even close to intact. 501 00:28:31,545 --> 00:28:34,047 And they were conscious for a long time 502 00:28:34,114 --> 00:28:36,416 before it all came apart. 503 00:28:39,052 --> 00:28:42,589 Colleen Werley died along with her fiancé Monty. 504 00:28:43,590 --> 00:28:49,396 As a mother, you keep waiting for your... child to come home. 505 00:28:50,497 --> 00:28:55,569 And Colleen had travelled so much in her life, 506 00:28:55,636 --> 00:28:59,173 that it was... it was unusual 507 00:28:59,239 --> 00:29:01,375 not to have her just walk in the door. 508 00:29:03,877 --> 00:29:06,947 All this time, you're thinking, 509 00:29:07,014 --> 00:29:10,184 something caused this, something made this happen. 510 00:29:10,217 --> 00:29:13,187 And I want to find out who's responsible for this. 511 00:29:22,529 --> 00:29:24,965 The investigation into Flight 261 512 00:29:25,032 --> 00:29:26,633 immediately got underway. 513 00:29:26,667 --> 00:29:29,436 But the wreckage lay 700 feet down. 514 00:29:29,503 --> 00:29:31,872 So National Transportation Safety Board officials 515 00:29:31,939 --> 00:29:34,474 called on Navy submersibles to retrieve the debris 516 00:29:34,541 --> 00:29:36,109 from the sea bed. 517 00:29:36,143 --> 00:29:37,744 We set up a base of operations 518 00:29:37,811 --> 00:29:39,613 and we had a remote operating vehicle 519 00:29:39,680 --> 00:29:42,082 with the side-scanning sonar which they used 520 00:29:42,149 --> 00:29:46,653 to map the debris field an get an idea of how widely spread the wreckage was. 521 00:29:55,362 --> 00:29:57,998 At the National Transportation Safety Board headquarters 522 00:29:58,031 --> 00:30:00,133 in Washington, the investigators' 523 00:30:00,167 --> 00:30:01,935 immediate concern was to find out 524 00:30:01,969 --> 00:30:03,804 what had brought the plane down. 525 00:30:03,837 --> 00:30:06,940 The first clues came from the cockpit voice recordings. 526 00:30:06,974 --> 00:30:09,843 LA? Alaska 261, we're with you. 527 00:30:09,877 --> 00:30:13,580 We're at 22-5, we have a jammed stabiliser 528 00:30:13,647 --> 00:30:16,450 and we're maintaining altitude with difficulty. 529 00:30:16,483 --> 00:30:18,952 We immediately suspected some problem 530 00:30:19,019 --> 00:30:22,756 in the tail of the airplane which is where the controls are. 531 00:30:22,789 --> 00:30:24,658 Something was wrong back there 532 00:30:24,725 --> 00:30:27,261 and that was the key piece of wreckage to look for. 533 00:30:31,999 --> 00:30:35,235 The MD-83 that crashed was a revised version 534 00:30:35,302 --> 00:30:38,038 of the Douglas Corporation's popular DC-9. 535 00:30:38,071 --> 00:30:41,508 Over 2000 of which were delivered to airlines worldwide. 536 00:30:41,542 --> 00:30:44,278 The engines were at the rear and the distinctive 537 00:30:44,344 --> 00:30:46,914 T-shaped tail was an essential element of the design. 538 00:30:48,415 --> 00:30:50,083 In a big turbo jet aircraft, 539 00:30:50,150 --> 00:30:52,719 one of the brilliant elements of the design 540 00:30:52,786 --> 00:30:56,223 is that since you're going to be loading passengers and cargo, 541 00:30:56,290 --> 00:30:58,892 you want to be able to have that aircraft a little nose-heavy 542 00:30:58,959 --> 00:31:00,961 or a little tail-heavy. Well, in order to do that, 543 00:31:01,028 --> 00:31:04,431 you actually had to have that entire stabiliser moving. 544 00:31:04,464 --> 00:31:06,934 But the ones that are the most difficult to engineer 545 00:31:07,000 --> 00:31:10,103 are the T-tailed airplanes where you have the vertical stabiliser 546 00:31:10,170 --> 00:31:12,206 and the horizontal sitting on top. 547 00:31:12,239 --> 00:31:14,708 And we call that stabiliser "trim" 548 00:31:14,775 --> 00:31:16,677 and that is an essential element 549 00:31:16,743 --> 00:31:19,646 of what makes these aircrafts so usable. 550 00:31:19,680 --> 00:31:23,016 In the MD-83, a motorised jackscrew 551 00:31:23,083 --> 00:31:26,320 in the tail moves the horizontal stabiliser up and down. 552 00:31:26,353 --> 00:31:28,555 As the stabiliser moves up, 553 00:31:28,622 --> 00:31:30,791 the nose of the plane moves down. 554 00:31:30,824 --> 00:31:34,194 As the stabiliser moves down, the nose moves up. 555 00:31:36,897 --> 00:31:39,299 But what role had the two-foot jackscrew 556 00:31:39,333 --> 00:31:41,835 played in the loss of Flight 261? 557 00:31:41,869 --> 00:31:44,438 The investigators were anxious to inspect it 558 00:31:44,505 --> 00:31:46,874 as soon as it was recovered from the sea bed. 559 00:31:46,907 --> 00:31:49,643 The jackscrew wasn't mated 560 00:31:49,710 --> 00:31:52,079 with the nut that it screws into. 561 00:31:52,112 --> 00:31:53,881 It was just by itself. 562 00:31:53,914 --> 00:31:56,283 And the nut was found in another piece of structure 563 00:31:56,350 --> 00:31:58,752 a few feet away from where the jackscrew was. 564 00:31:58,785 --> 00:32:02,856 To have a screw separate itself from a nut 565 00:32:02,923 --> 00:32:05,092 with very thick threads surprised us. 566 00:32:05,792 --> 00:32:09,530 Secondly, we noticed that there was a curled piece of brass 567 00:32:09,596 --> 00:32:13,534 around the jackscrew. And all of the threads... 568 00:32:13,567 --> 00:32:17,337 that you can see here, these ridges were gone, 569 00:32:17,404 --> 00:32:18,906 they had been stripped out. 570 00:32:18,939 --> 00:32:23,110 And the remnants of those were found coiled on the jackscrew. 571 00:32:25,078 --> 00:32:27,548 Once the thread had been stripped off the nut, 572 00:32:27,614 --> 00:32:30,150 the jackscrew could no longer turn. 573 00:32:30,184 --> 00:32:33,487 The pilots could not have known the real nature of the problem. 574 00:32:39,893 --> 00:32:42,863 The crew was confronted with a situation 575 00:32:42,930 --> 00:32:44,798 that had never occurred before. 576 00:32:44,831 --> 00:32:48,302 There is no failed jackscrew procedure 577 00:32:48,368 --> 00:32:51,772 in the quick reference handbooks that they have available. 578 00:32:51,805 --> 00:32:53,440 There's no training for it. 579 00:32:59,680 --> 00:33:02,149 When the jackscrew jammed, 580 00:33:02,216 --> 00:33:04,852 the crew were unable to adjust the stabiliser. 581 00:33:04,885 --> 00:33:06,753 We felt that it was due to the fact 582 00:33:06,820 --> 00:33:08,989 that these nut threads had worn away 583 00:33:09,056 --> 00:33:11,959 and it was just too hard for that jackscrew 584 00:33:12,025 --> 00:33:14,428 under the power of the electric motor to turn. 585 00:33:14,461 --> 00:33:16,396 That gave the flight crew an indication 586 00:33:16,463 --> 00:33:17,865 that there was a problem. 587 00:33:17,898 --> 00:33:20,701 The crew knew they had a problem in the tail plane. 588 00:33:20,734 --> 00:33:22,503 But they had no idea what. 589 00:33:22,536 --> 00:33:24,671 Two motors controlled the jackscrew. 590 00:33:24,738 --> 00:33:26,607 They tried each in turn. 591 00:33:26,640 --> 00:33:29,443 But the pilots attempts to free the jammed stabiliser 592 00:33:29,510 --> 00:33:32,546 inadvertently made their situation worse. 593 00:33:32,579 --> 00:33:34,982 We're at 23-7... request... 594 00:33:36,383 --> 00:33:38,318 Yeah, we've got it under control here. 595 00:33:38,352 --> 00:33:39,686 No, we don't. 596 00:33:40,487 --> 00:33:43,357 Where they went wrong was that 597 00:33:43,423 --> 00:33:46,360 they wanted to try both the alternate 598 00:33:46,426 --> 00:33:49,963 and the primary trim motors at the same time. 599 00:33:49,997 --> 00:33:53,033 When the pilots switched both the electric motors on, 600 00:33:53,100 --> 00:33:56,136 the jackscrew moved, but the threads had given way 601 00:33:56,203 --> 00:34:00,040 and the jackscrew was now held only by a single retaining nut. 602 00:34:00,073 --> 00:34:02,609 From here on, the plane was doomed. 603 00:34:05,746 --> 00:34:07,814 That end nut was never designed 604 00:34:07,881 --> 00:34:12,286 to hold the loads generated aerodynamically by the airplane. 605 00:34:15,889 --> 00:34:16,924 Let's get speed brakes. 606 00:34:19,560 --> 00:34:21,562 Give me high-pressure pumps. - Okay. 607 00:34:23,063 --> 00:34:25,799 Now we know, in the glaring light of hindsight, 608 00:34:25,832 --> 00:34:28,468 now when we turn the situation around in time 609 00:34:28,535 --> 00:34:31,872 and look back, we can see that this air crew, 610 00:34:31,939 --> 00:34:35,642 and no air crew should have ever been fooling with the trim 611 00:34:35,676 --> 00:34:37,544 and trying to run it back and forth. 612 00:34:39,646 --> 00:34:42,950 The retaining nut grew weaker and weaker. 613 00:34:44,251 --> 00:34:47,154 Then, finally, through the loads 614 00:34:47,221 --> 00:34:51,325 beating down on that nut, the nut finally failed. 615 00:34:52,392 --> 00:34:53,794 - Feel that? - Yeah. 616 00:34:53,827 --> 00:34:54,928 Okay, give me slats. 617 00:34:54,962 --> 00:34:56,063 The jackscrew slipped 618 00:34:56,129 --> 00:34:57,664 completely out of the acme nut 619 00:34:57,731 --> 00:34:59,499 allowing the horizontal stabiliser 620 00:34:59,533 --> 00:35:02,936 to move well beyond its aerodynamic limits. 621 00:35:03,804 --> 00:35:05,239 This is a bitch. 622 00:35:05,272 --> 00:35:06,640 - Is it? - Yeah. 623 00:35:09,576 --> 00:35:11,445 The stabiliser forced the plane down. 624 00:35:11,478 --> 00:35:14,414 And now, completely out of control, 625 00:35:14,481 --> 00:35:17,317 it rolled over into its final dive. 626 00:35:20,320 --> 00:35:22,122 Okay, let's get rudder. 627 00:35:22,155 --> 00:35:24,057 Left rudder, left rudder! 628 00:35:24,091 --> 00:35:25,792 I can't reach it. 629 00:35:27,661 --> 00:35:32,432 This crew was working to recover the aircraft 630 00:35:32,499 --> 00:35:34,334 right down to the water. 631 00:35:34,401 --> 00:35:36,203 I mean, they did not give up 632 00:35:36,270 --> 00:35:38,172 the whole way down through the descent. 633 00:35:44,811 --> 00:35:45,712 Here we go. 634 00:35:56,957 --> 00:35:59,059 It was clear to the investigators 635 00:35:59,126 --> 00:36:00,694 that the failure of the jackscrew 636 00:36:00,761 --> 00:36:02,262 was the only explanation 637 00:36:02,329 --> 00:36:05,699 for the plane's erratic flight path and final dive. 638 00:36:05,732 --> 00:36:07,801 But why had this happened? 639 00:36:07,835 --> 00:36:10,604 Why had the jackscrew failed? 640 00:36:19,413 --> 00:36:22,149 The investigators began looking deeper and deeper 641 00:36:22,216 --> 00:36:24,184 into the condition of the faulty jackscrew 642 00:36:24,251 --> 00:36:25,953 on Flight 261. 643 00:36:25,986 --> 00:36:27,788 What had caused it to fail? 644 00:36:30,357 --> 00:36:33,527 There was no lubrication or visible grease 645 00:36:33,594 --> 00:36:35,929 on the working area of the screw. 646 00:36:35,963 --> 00:36:39,066 That was surprising and strange. 647 00:36:54,348 --> 00:36:56,884 The discovery of no grease on the jackscrew 648 00:36:56,950 --> 00:36:58,652 alarmed the investigators. 649 00:36:58,685 --> 00:37:01,255 They alerted the Federal Aviation Administration 650 00:37:01,321 --> 00:37:05,158 who ordered an immediate check on all the MD-80s in the USA. 651 00:37:06,059 --> 00:37:09,162 This led to a shocking discovery. 652 00:37:09,196 --> 00:37:13,534 At Alaska Airlines, in six of its fleet of 34 planes, 653 00:37:13,600 --> 00:37:15,869 the jackscrew assembly needed to be replaced 654 00:37:15,936 --> 00:37:18,272 after failing new inspections. 655 00:37:21,475 --> 00:37:23,410 No grease is the culprit. 656 00:37:23,443 --> 00:37:26,180 No grease or inadequate grease 657 00:37:26,246 --> 00:37:28,715 is the only thing that can give you that wear rate. 658 00:37:30,284 --> 00:37:33,787 A simple lack of grease led to the failure of the jackscrew 659 00:37:33,854 --> 00:37:36,456 and the loss of 88 lives. 660 00:37:36,490 --> 00:37:39,660 But why did this happen at Alaska Airlines? 661 00:37:39,693 --> 00:37:44,298 The investigators' attention now switched to the company's maintenance program. 662 00:37:45,165 --> 00:37:48,168 What emerged was deeply worrying. 663 00:37:48,202 --> 00:37:51,371 We interviewed all the mechanics 664 00:37:51,438 --> 00:37:53,140 who had worked on these airplanes. 665 00:37:53,173 --> 00:37:56,210 We knew that they had been falsifying records 666 00:37:56,276 --> 00:37:58,612 or not doing the work they had indicated. 667 00:37:59,413 --> 00:38:01,815 The mechanics at Alaska complained that they were 668 00:38:01,882 --> 00:38:03,851 pressured to keep the planes in the air 669 00:38:03,917 --> 00:38:07,754 or that their recommendations were overruled by supervisors. 670 00:38:07,788 --> 00:38:10,157 Some alleged that records were altered 671 00:38:10,224 --> 00:38:12,192 to show work done that was not done. 672 00:38:17,030 --> 00:38:20,033 Alaska has long been one of America's most successful 673 00:38:20,100 --> 00:38:22,803 airlines, but in the early 1990s, 674 00:38:22,870 --> 00:38:25,472 the economic downturn hit the company hard. 675 00:38:25,506 --> 00:38:30,010 Its response was to slash costs to revive its fortunes. 676 00:38:33,480 --> 00:38:35,082 Pilots, maintenance workers, 677 00:38:35,148 --> 00:38:37,651 management and others had to make sacrifices. 678 00:38:37,684 --> 00:38:39,753 Jobs were lost, pay was cut 679 00:38:39,786 --> 00:38:43,524 and every hour aircraft spent on the ground was seen as waste. 680 00:38:46,560 --> 00:38:48,629 Two years of aggressive axe wielding 681 00:38:48,662 --> 00:38:51,231 saw costs come down by 80 million dollars. 682 00:38:52,099 --> 00:38:55,169 Profits leaped. It was a corporate triumph. 683 00:38:55,202 --> 00:38:57,971 In Alaska's case, in the early nineties, 684 00:38:58,038 --> 00:39:00,741 this airline had to do an incredible job 685 00:39:00,807 --> 00:39:04,178 of reforming itself from a fairly high-cost carrier 686 00:39:04,244 --> 00:39:07,181 to a lower-cost carrier that could compete head on 687 00:39:07,247 --> 00:39:09,249 with South West Airlines and with others. 688 00:39:09,283 --> 00:39:10,684 And they did it. They did it brilliantly. 689 00:39:10,717 --> 00:39:13,020 Nobody really believed that it could happen. 690 00:39:13,987 --> 00:39:17,291 Alaska Airlines began flying the planes more intensively. 691 00:39:17,324 --> 00:39:20,761 It doubled the average daily use of its fleet. 692 00:39:22,329 --> 00:39:24,665 But keeping the planes in the air earning money 693 00:39:24,731 --> 00:39:27,034 put maintenance schedules under pressure. 694 00:39:33,740 --> 00:39:35,742 John Leyatine was former lead mechanic 695 00:39:35,809 --> 00:39:38,846 at Alaska Airline's Oakland maintenance facility 696 00:39:38,912 --> 00:39:40,814 where he worked for over eight years. 697 00:39:43,050 --> 00:39:45,752 Leyatine felt that the new pressures on maintenance 698 00:39:45,819 --> 00:39:48,088 put passengers' lives at risk. 699 00:39:48,121 --> 00:39:51,258 He was to pay dearly for expressing those concerns. 700 00:39:51,291 --> 00:39:54,394 We have used an actor to portray his experiences 701 00:39:54,461 --> 00:39:57,598 based on his sworn evidence to the NTSB. 702 00:40:00,901 --> 00:40:02,903 Leyatine claimed that planes 703 00:40:02,970 --> 00:40:05,339 were pushed back into service too quickly. 704 00:40:05,372 --> 00:40:09,309 Sometimes, rather than wait for a replacement part or repair, 705 00:40:09,376 --> 00:40:12,246 supervisors passed planes fit for service... 706 00:40:12,312 --> 00:40:15,249 free to carry passengers up into the air. 707 00:40:24,091 --> 00:40:28,161 In October 1998, over 15 months before the crash, 708 00:40:28,228 --> 00:40:31,498 John Leyatine became so worried that he did something 709 00:40:31,565 --> 00:40:33,567 that would change his life forever. 710 00:40:33,600 --> 00:40:37,004 He reported Alaska Airlines to the US Department 711 00:40:37,070 --> 00:40:41,141 of Transportation, alleging violations in maintenance procedures. 712 00:40:42,976 --> 00:40:47,614 There were very few voices at Alaska who had concerns 713 00:40:47,681 --> 00:40:49,383 about the maintenance and there should have been more 714 00:40:49,416 --> 00:40:51,118 and there should have been people listening. 715 00:40:51,151 --> 00:40:53,620 John Leyatine is a hero in my book. 716 00:40:57,291 --> 00:41:00,961 In December 1999, over a year before the crash, 717 00:41:01,028 --> 00:41:04,064 the FAA and Department of Transportation officials 718 00:41:04,131 --> 00:41:06,166 moved on Alaska Airlines. 719 00:41:20,147 --> 00:41:22,683 The case was referred to Federal prosecutors 720 00:41:22,749 --> 00:41:26,220 and the FBI raided Alaska's maintenance facilities 721 00:41:26,286 --> 00:41:29,289 and seized thousands of records. 722 00:41:30,591 --> 00:41:32,526 The raid was the opening shot 723 00:41:32,559 --> 00:41:34,261 in a Federal Grand Jury investigation, 724 00:41:34,328 --> 00:41:36,129 that would last three years. 725 00:41:38,198 --> 00:41:41,235 No criminal charges were brought against the airline. 726 00:41:41,268 --> 00:41:44,104 Alaska officials denied that any unsafe planes 727 00:41:44,171 --> 00:41:48,308 were put into service or that passengers' lives were ever at risk. 728 00:41:49,276 --> 00:41:53,347 But the investigation revealed hundreds of violations of Federal regulations. 729 00:41:55,449 --> 00:41:57,618 Alaska Airlines was fined. 730 00:41:57,651 --> 00:42:00,621 The FAA insisted on changes to the company's maintenance 731 00:42:00,687 --> 00:42:02,723 and safety procedures. 732 00:42:02,756 --> 00:42:05,492 The FAA also suspended two supervisors 733 00:42:05,559 --> 00:42:07,261 for falsifying records. 734 00:42:15,035 --> 00:42:18,205 Like other whistleblowers, John Leyatine would pay heavily 735 00:42:18,272 --> 00:42:20,541 for his efforts to save lives. 736 00:42:20,574 --> 00:42:23,343 Alaska put him on paid leave from his job, 737 00:42:23,410 --> 00:42:27,281 losing him thousands of dollars in regular overtime earnings. 738 00:42:35,289 --> 00:42:37,324 Then in January 2000, 739 00:42:37,391 --> 00:42:40,627 John Leyatine saw his worst nightmare come true. 740 00:42:41,361 --> 00:42:43,564 The kind of accident he had tried to prevent 741 00:42:43,630 --> 00:42:46,800 now took place just off the California Coast. 742 00:43:16,196 --> 00:43:18,365 After the loss of Flight 261, 743 00:43:18,432 --> 00:43:21,802 Leyatine went back to his private work records. 744 00:43:23,504 --> 00:43:26,306 Incredibly, he found he had a direct link 745 00:43:26,373 --> 00:43:28,375 to the crashed airliner. 746 00:43:28,408 --> 00:43:31,245 Two years before at the plane's last overhaul, 747 00:43:31,311 --> 00:43:33,013 he had ordered that the jackscrew 748 00:43:33,080 --> 00:43:35,782 on this particular very aircraft be replaced. 749 00:43:35,816 --> 00:43:37,985 He then went off-shift. 750 00:43:40,454 --> 00:43:42,923 When investigators examined the record, 751 00:43:42,990 --> 00:43:45,058 they found that Leyatine's recommendation 752 00:43:45,125 --> 00:43:47,194 had been overruled by the next shift 753 00:43:47,261 --> 00:43:49,897 and the plane put back into service. 754 00:43:51,398 --> 00:43:54,401 It would be two years before the next overhaul, 755 00:43:54,468 --> 00:43:56,403 but time ran out. 756 00:43:56,436 --> 00:44:01,275 Four months before the overhaul was due, Flight 261 crashed. 757 00:44:06,980 --> 00:44:10,751 Alaska Airlines labelled Leyatine a disruptive influence. 758 00:44:10,784 --> 00:44:12,686 He sued the company for libel. 759 00:44:12,719 --> 00:44:16,557 Alaska settled, but Leyatine could no longer work 760 00:44:16,623 --> 00:44:18,258 in the industry he loved. 761 00:44:19,393 --> 00:44:21,295 I get calls almost every week, 762 00:44:21,361 --> 00:44:23,463 somebody saying, "Should I blow the whistle?" 763 00:44:23,530 --> 00:44:25,732 And I always tell them, "You need to know... 764 00:44:25,799 --> 00:44:28,769 you need to be prepared to find another line of work 765 00:44:28,836 --> 00:44:30,470 because you will not work in the industry 766 00:44:30,537 --> 00:44:32,206 and you will not work in the government." 767 00:44:32,239 --> 00:44:34,908 In most cases, it's almost impossible 768 00:44:34,975 --> 00:44:38,345 to be a whistleblower and survive your career. 769 00:44:48,856 --> 00:44:52,793 As the investigators continued their work into Flight 261, 770 00:44:52,860 --> 00:44:55,529 they made another disturbing discovery about the drive 771 00:44:55,596 --> 00:44:57,865 to cut costs at Alaska Airlines. 772 00:44:57,898 --> 00:45:00,200 To keep planes flying more intensively, 773 00:45:00,267 --> 00:45:04,171 Alaska had dramatically extended the intervals between service. 774 00:45:07,207 --> 00:45:10,611 This was significant because when a plane is designed, 775 00:45:10,677 --> 00:45:13,814 every part has a schedule listing when it is serviced 776 00:45:13,881 --> 00:45:15,682 and when it must be replaced. 777 00:45:15,716 --> 00:45:18,886 You're supposed to go in and inspect every so many hours 778 00:45:18,952 --> 00:45:21,154 and that's different on parts all over the plane. 779 00:45:21,188 --> 00:45:23,524 Some things you have to look at after every flight, 780 00:45:23,590 --> 00:45:25,459 other things have to be inspected 781 00:45:25,526 --> 00:45:27,027 every two or three days. 782 00:45:28,462 --> 00:45:32,399 In 1996, Alaska Airlines extended the intervals 783 00:45:32,466 --> 00:45:36,970 between MD-80 jackscrew inspections by 400%. 784 00:45:37,004 --> 00:45:40,140 Before 1996, jackscrews were inspected 785 00:45:40,207 --> 00:45:42,409 every 600 flight hours. 786 00:45:42,442 --> 00:45:45,012 Now, there was over two and a half thousand hours 787 00:45:45,078 --> 00:45:46,980 between each service. 788 00:45:47,014 --> 00:45:50,617 If you had 600 hours between inspection points 789 00:45:50,684 --> 00:45:52,920 and greasing points, we have no chance 790 00:45:52,986 --> 00:45:55,923 of ever having a metal to metal contact situation, 791 00:45:55,956 --> 00:45:59,126 but if you put that up to 2 000 hours or 2 500 hours, 792 00:45:59,159 --> 00:46:03,096 now what you do is eat into some of these protective stages, 793 00:46:03,130 --> 00:46:06,533 these barriers that we have towards catastrophic failure. 794 00:46:10,103 --> 00:46:13,507 In its final report into the crash of Flight 261, 795 00:46:13,574 --> 00:46:17,644 the NTSB concluded that the extended service intervals 796 00:46:17,678 --> 00:46:20,180 for the jackscrews on its MD-80s 797 00:46:20,214 --> 00:46:23,016 was a significant contributor to the crash. 798 00:46:30,257 --> 00:46:33,293 With carriers doing anything to save a dime, 799 00:46:33,360 --> 00:46:36,496 maintenance, safety took a back seat. 800 00:46:36,530 --> 00:46:39,533 And one of the shocking things about Alaska 801 00:46:39,600 --> 00:46:43,337 is that they were allowed to increase inspection intervals. 802 00:46:43,370 --> 00:46:44,705 And it's very shocking 803 00:46:44,771 --> 00:46:47,207 because that is the only way we have safety. 804 00:46:51,044 --> 00:46:53,881 The extended maintenance intervals meant that 805 00:46:53,947 --> 00:46:56,817 the lack of grease on the jackscrew went undiscovered. 806 00:46:58,218 --> 00:47:01,955 But now, investigators wondered if the failure of the jackscrew 807 00:47:02,022 --> 00:47:05,359 assembly revealed a basic flaw in the plane's design. 808 00:47:07,361 --> 00:47:12,266 They found that the MD-80 broke one of the fundamental rules of aircraft design: 809 00:47:12,332 --> 00:47:14,168 It was not fail-safe. 810 00:47:15,936 --> 00:47:19,439 The design philosophy that has made aviation so safe 811 00:47:19,506 --> 00:47:22,209 is that we should never ever have a situation 812 00:47:22,276 --> 00:47:25,445 in which one catastrophic failure of some component 813 00:47:25,512 --> 00:47:28,148 in the airplane causes us to lose the airplane. 814 00:47:28,182 --> 00:47:31,185 These backups to the backup, backing up the backups, 815 00:47:31,251 --> 00:47:34,621 is why we can get on an airplane with almost 100% assurance 816 00:47:34,688 --> 00:47:36,590 that we're gonna get where we want to go safely. 817 00:47:36,623 --> 00:47:40,260 There was no backup to the jackscrew and its nut. 818 00:47:40,294 --> 00:47:43,864 Engineers never envisioned a situation on the MD-80 819 00:47:43,931 --> 00:47:45,832 where the jackscrew might fail. 820 00:47:45,866 --> 00:47:48,735 With inspections every 600 flight hours 821 00:47:48,802 --> 00:47:51,071 and replacements every 2 000 hours, 822 00:47:51,138 --> 00:47:54,675 the designers did not add an additional redundant backup system. 823 00:47:57,044 --> 00:47:59,947 It was utterly laughable that they said 824 00:48:00,013 --> 00:48:04,585 it was a redundant system. There is one screw and one nut. 825 00:48:04,618 --> 00:48:07,354 That's all there is. It's not redundant. 826 00:48:08,288 --> 00:48:11,792 The MD-80 continues to fly worldwide. 827 00:48:11,825 --> 00:48:15,095 Despite the revelation of this dangerous design flaw, 828 00:48:15,162 --> 00:48:17,898 the jackscrew assembly has not been redesigned. 829 00:48:17,931 --> 00:48:20,968 Inspection intervals have been shortened, 830 00:48:21,034 --> 00:48:23,737 but airlines still rely on proper maintenance 831 00:48:23,804 --> 00:48:26,073 to prevent the same accident happening again. 832 00:48:27,841 --> 00:48:31,478 In its final report, the National Transportation Safety Board concluded 833 00:48:31,545 --> 00:48:34,848 that the crash of Flight 261 was due to the lack of adequate 834 00:48:34,915 --> 00:48:38,018 greasing and the stretched service intervals. 835 00:48:38,051 --> 00:48:40,587 When coupled with the design of the jackscrew, 836 00:48:40,654 --> 00:48:43,423 these failures led to a completely avoidable accident 837 00:48:43,490 --> 00:48:45,959 and the loss of 88 lives. 838 00:49:05,179 --> 00:49:08,182 Three years after the crash of Flight 261, 839 00:49:08,248 --> 00:49:10,417 the relatives and friends of the dead 840 00:49:10,484 --> 00:49:12,419 dedicated a permanent memorial 841 00:49:12,486 --> 00:49:15,289 at Port Wynamie, close to the crash site. 842 00:49:22,896 --> 00:49:26,667 I think the best thing and the only thing 843 00:49:26,733 --> 00:49:30,504 in our infinite inadequacy of making up for the loss 844 00:49:30,571 --> 00:49:32,906 from this life is to say something that we've been able 845 00:49:32,973 --> 00:49:34,641 to say in a lot of other accidents 846 00:49:34,675 --> 00:49:36,777 to other grieving families, and that is, 847 00:49:36,844 --> 00:49:38,745 "Those deaths will not be in vain. 848 00:49:38,779 --> 00:49:41,014 We will not let them be in vain." 849 00:49:41,048 --> 00:49:43,884 Every one of those lives will be made to count 850 00:49:43,951 --> 00:49:46,320 in terms of making sure that three, four, five 851 00:49:46,386 --> 00:49:48,288 or ten other people do not die. 852 00:49:55,896 --> 00:49:58,131 Colleen was different, 853 00:49:58,198 --> 00:50:03,804 she was adventurous and there's nobody like that in our family. 854 00:50:05,572 --> 00:50:08,008 And I don't know... 855 00:50:08,075 --> 00:50:12,246 what we can do except to remember Colleen 856 00:50:12,312 --> 00:50:16,016 and to live our lives now a little bit better for her. 857 00:50:20,554 --> 00:50:22,089 You know, when I was growing up, 858 00:50:22,155 --> 00:50:23,790 we didn't wear seatbelts. 859 00:50:23,824 --> 00:50:25,626 There weren't even seatbelts in cars. 860 00:50:26,960 --> 00:50:30,330 And now, we know that we need to wear our seatbelts. 861 00:50:30,364 --> 00:50:33,166 We didn't know that much about smoking cigarettes, 862 00:50:33,233 --> 00:50:36,170 and now, we know that we can't smoke cigarettes. 863 00:50:36,203 --> 00:50:39,973 Well, there's a lot to learn about airline safety too. 864 00:50:41,675 --> 00:50:43,610 None of us are the same anymore. 865 00:50:43,644 --> 00:50:46,747 It's like walking into a giant storm... 866 00:50:46,813 --> 00:50:50,284 wave after wave, forming up coming in, 867 00:50:50,350 --> 00:50:52,252 because it never stops. 868 00:50:54,288 --> 00:50:56,456 Grief over the loss of a child 869 00:50:56,523 --> 00:50:59,960 is not something I wish on anybody. 870 00:51:01,195 --> 00:51:03,997 This plane went down because of neglect. 871 00:51:05,499 --> 00:51:09,503 It seems like such an unholy type of loss. 872 00:51:09,536 --> 00:51:11,805 What a hard way to die, 873 00:51:11,872 --> 00:51:16,176 so an airline can, you know, make more money. 874 00:51:30,724 --> 00:51:33,160 difuze